Abstract
The 1916–1917 Punitive Expedition by the United States into Mexico had two initial goals: dispersing the bands of Pancho Villa and improving border security. While historians have debated the outcome of the campaign, this article argues that the expedition failed, primarily because of President Woodrow Wilson’s conduct of civil-military relations. Throughout the Punitive Expedition, Wilson deferred too much to his military commanders, namely Major General Frederick Funston and Brigadier General John J. Pershing. He needlessly extended the U.S. presence in Mexico and failed to link policy aims to the use of military force.
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Cite this article
Alex Beckstrand, “Woodrow Wilson and the Struggle of Civil-Military Relations during the Punitive Expedition of 1916–1917,” The Journal of Military History 86, no. 2 (April 2022): 372–398.
