Abstract
Winston Churchill’s propagation of the infamous “ten year rule” has led to charges that he created the deficiencies in Britain’s defences that he denounced during the 1930s. This article shows that traditional explanations for Churchill’s attacks on defence spending during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924–29) oversimplify his motives and exaggerate his authority. His policies were shaped by a complex and shifting combination of political, financial, strategic, and bureaucratic goals. Churchill was not the instigator of the ten year rule in 1919, and he cannot be held responsible for its effects after leaving office. Even during the 1920s, the impact of the ten year rule was more modest than historians have generally recognized.
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Cite this article
Christopher M. Bell, “Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule,” The Journal of Military History 74, no. 4 (October 2010): 1097–1128.
