Abstract
This article challenges the thesis that the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu was decided by the overwhelming firepower of the besieging Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA). This has been the prevailing narrative in Western accounts of the battle, and long went undisputed because Vietnamese historians wrote little on the subject. However, a flood of new Vietnamese works published around the fiftieth anniversary of the siege in 2004 reveal that the VPA had only a modest quantitative advantage in artillery and fired fewer shells than the French. Its victory therefore owed more to superior engineering, innovative tactics, and other factors.
Read the full article
Members: read on EBSCO
Use the access code from this quarter's member email. Every issue since 1937 is online, with no embargo.
Lost your code? Email jmhsmh@vmi.edu or sign in at the EBSCOhost member login.
Not a member? Buy this article
A PDF sent by email from the Journal office during business hours, $10.
Through a library: sign in with your institution
Full text is in EBSCO's America: History and Life with Full Text and Historical Abstracts with Full Text, and through EBSCO Discovery.
Join: read everything, every year
Membership includes the printed journal and full online access to the archive.
Cite this article
Kevin M. Boylan, “No “Technical Knockout”: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu,” The Journal of Military History 78, no. 4 (October 2014): 1349–1383.
