The Journal of Military History

Abstract

This article challenges the thesis that the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu was decided by the overwhelming firepower of the besieging Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA). This has been the prevailing narrative in Western accounts of the battle, and long went undisputed because Vietnamese historians wrote little on the subject. However, a flood of new Vietnamese works published around the fiftieth anniversary of the siege in 2004 reveal that the VPA had only a modest quantitative advantage in artillery and fired fewer shells than the French. Its victory therefore owed more to superior engineering, innovative tactics, and other factors.

Moncado Prize 2015

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Cite this article

Kevin M. Boylan, “No “Technical Knockout”: Giap’s Artillery at Dien Bien Phu,” The Journal of Military History 78, no. 4 (October 2014): 1349–1383.

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Also in Vol. 78, No. 4

  1. George C. Marshall Lecture

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