The Journal of Military History

Abstract

The fall of 1864 saw one Confederate military disaster after another: Sherman took Atlanta, Farragut seized Mobile, Sheridan defeated Early three times in the Shenandoah Valley, and Grant penned up Lee in Petersburg. Northern voters followed the battle returns and reelected Lincoln. The South had lost both the military and the political war by mid-November 1864. Yet Lee, who was the real head of the Confederacy, remained silent on the need to make peace on Union terms. This article addresses the question—largely ignored by historians—of the reasons for Lee’s Great Silence and concludes that Lee’s unwillingness to oppose his friend and sponsor, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, was the decisive factor in his inaction, although reluctance to engage in confrontation and belief in civilian supremacy over the military had some impact.

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Cite this article

James T. Carney, “The Great Silence of Robert E. Lee,” The Journal of Military History 83, no. 1 (January 2019): 97–126.

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