The Journal of Military History

Abstract

The role that Admiralty communications intelligence played in the Battle of Jutland has been given mixed reviews in histories of the battle. Historians acknowledge the superb performance of the Admiralty’s cryptographic organization in efficiently decrypting German naval communications before and during the battle, yet the fact that communications intelligence did not reach Admiral Jellicoe in usable or recognizable form had led historians to judge this a failure. This article argues that contrary to the accepted history, the dissemination system performed as planned, since the Admiralty placed a higher premium on the security of the intelligence source over its operational use by the fleet at sea.

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Cite this article

Jason Hines, “Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland,” The Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 (October 2008): 1117–1153.

RISBibTeXDOI: 10.1353/jmh.0.0092

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