Abstract
According to the U.S. Army’s official history, joint army-navy logistics reached a high point during World War II in the Central Pacific. That required the creative integration of army and navy methods. Although the pre-war U.S. Navy emphasized the importance of mobility, its logistical methods were inadequate to meet the challenges of war in the Pacific. Collaboration with the army led to improvements that sustained a rapid tempo of offensive operations and enabled numerous victories. By 1945, a new paradigm emerged, allowing the navy’s striking forces to maintain a forward presence for months in the face of increasing Japanese resistance.
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Cite this article
Trent Hone, “From Mobile Fleet to Mobile Force: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Logistics in the Central Pacific during World War II,” The Journal of Military History 87, no. 2 (April 2023): 367–403.