Abstract
This article explores debates over whether Britain could have adopted a more “indirect approach” during the First World War (1914–18). It shows that convincing arguments that British sea power offered a legitimate alternative to the strategy of attrition on the Western Front never received due consideration because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus. Britain might have fought the First World War very differently, and it might have been in its interest to have done so.
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Cite this article
David Morgan-Owen, “War as It Might Have Been: British Sea Power and the First World War,” The Journal of Military History 83, no. 4 (October 2019): 1095–1131.
