Abstract
This article examines how the French viewed British military preparations for a war against Germany in the 1930s. It focuses on declining French expectations of the effectiveness of British military support as the reality of Britain’s small and ill-prepared Field Force became apparent as war approached. Nevertheless, France continued to place a high moral value on immediate British participation in the common fight, as a token of her commitment to the alliance and long-term potential. For that reason, careful monitoring of British military developments and strategic intentions remained central to France’s preparations for a future war with Germany.
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Cite this article
William Philpott and Martin S. Alexander, “The French and the British Field Force: Moral Support or Material Contribution?,” The Journal of Military History 71, no. 3 (July 2007): 743–772.
