Abstract
Caught by surprise by the Syrian and Egyptian armies at the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) experienced serious reverses on both the Golan and Sinai fronts during the early days of hostilities but recovered more quickly in the north than in the south. The Israeli government’s prioritization of the Golan front early in the war and the cumulative effects of at least six other variables—terrain, frontline forces, command and control (C2), reserve mobilization, airpower, and combined arms warfare—explain the IDF’s better performance in the north during the early days of the conflict.
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Cite this article
David Rodman, “A Tale of Two Fronts: Israeli Military Performance during the Early Days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War,” The Journal of Military History 82, no. 1 (January 2018): 208–218.
