Abstract
Addressing one aspect of the larger problem of the U.S. Army’s often poor performance during the War of 1812, this essay focuses on the War Department’s attempt to create a competent officer corps. The article provides data about the officers’ social origins and discusses their difficulties in performing their duties, as revealed in the transcripts of 334 general courts martial. The conclusions suggest that officers were judged more severely for their moral and character defects than for their shortcomings in performing routine duties. These findings also explain why, unlike their European counterparts in the Napoleonic era, most U.S. Army officers failed to achieve the necessary degree of proficiency.
Read the full article
Members: read on EBSCO
Use the access code from this quarter's member email. Every issue since 1937 is online, with no embargo.
Lost your code? Email jmhsmh@vmi.edu or sign in at the EBSCOhost member login.
Not a member? Buy this article
A PDF sent by email from the Journal office during business hours, $10.
Through a library: sign in with your institution
Full text is in EBSCO's America: History and Life with Full Text and Historical Abstracts with Full Text, and through EBSCO Discovery.
Join: read everything, every year
Membership includes the printed journal and full online access to the archive.
Cite this article
J. C. A. Stagg, “United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait,” The Journal of Military History 76, no. 4 (October 2012): 1001–1034.
