Abstract
This paper examines why the RAF maintained its view that it would be neither appropriate nor prudent to protect its bombers with long-range fighter escort until the time, late in the day, when the U.S. Army Air Forces’ trials to increase the Spitfire fighter’s range proved otherwise. The paper argues that some senior RAF officers, who believed that long-range fighters were unnecessary, lacked the conceptual dexterity needed after the RAF’s bombers’ vulnerability to single-engined fighters became apparent, and that these failings were hidden by a culture of obedience to perceived wisdom that existed within the RAF.
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Cite this article
David Stubbs, “A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (RAF) and Long-Range Fighters, 1936–1944,” The Journal of Military History 78, no. 2 (April 2014): 673–702.