Abstract
The genesis of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine was the work of Major General Winfield Scott and officer and scholar Henry Halleck, whom he sent to Europe prior to the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) in part to study Napoleon’s failed occupation of Spain during the Peninsular War (1808–1814). The novel occupation program that Scott called “measures of conciliation” aimed to forestall insurgency and win compliance among the Mexican people. While many historians are familiar with Scott’s military-legal codes enacted in Mexico, Halleck’s role in the development of U.S. Army COIN doctrine and its direct influence on the formation of the Lieber Code during the U.S. Civil War and thence the Geneva Convention articles has been overlooked. This article reviews the war and explores the collaboration between Scott and Halleck and its historic influence.
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Cite this article
Benjamin J. Swenson, “’Measures of Conciliation’: Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, and the Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” The Journal of Military History 86, no. 4 (October 2022): 859–881.
