The Journal of Military History

Abstract

The Sassanids engaged in a series of conflicts with the Hephthalites between 474 and 484; the most significant culminated at the Battle of Merv in 484 with the death of King Pērōz I on the field of battle, plunging the Sassanid Empire into a protracted political crisis. This paper reconsiders Pērōz’s generalship and the tactics at the Battle of Merv, focusing on the use of the battlefield trench by the Hephthalite Huns. By building up a picture of how accurate our primary sources are in their description of the battlefield and how detailed are the accounts about the preparations for the battle by the Hephthalite troops, it explains King Pērōz’s decision to ignore lessons from previous battles against steppe armies and order a full-scale charge against the Hephthalite army.

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Cite this article

Georgios Theotokis, “Reconsidering Pērōz’s Generalship at the Battle of Merv (484): Lessons Learned or Lessons Missed?,” The Journal of Military History 90, no. 1 (January 2026): 9–30.

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