Abstract
Between the world wars, senior officers in both the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy sought to create an interservice culture through the integration of strategic planning, professional military education, and, most importantly, the conduct of large-scale joint exercises. Rather than solely emphasizing the issue of command arrangements that dominate previous studies, this study highlights a number of factors that complicated efforts to cooperate, including disagreements over individual service responsibilities, the advent of new technologies and capabilities, and the cultural divide between the services. Ultimately, these measures to institutionalize coordination and regular joint training fell short of their intent and left a mixed legacy.
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Cite this article
Ryan Wadle, “Failing to Speak the Same Language: The Roots of ’Jointness’ in the United States, 1919–1941,” The Journal of Military History 84, no. 4 (October 2020): 1097–1126.
