The Journal of Military History

Abstract

After the Battle of Saratoga (October 1777) in the American War of Independence, British leaders conducted a comprehensive reassessment of their military strategy but examined the new strategy’s ways and means without considering the ends or objectives of the war. Using extensive primary sources, this article examines the reassessment process and concludes that the effort was fatally flawed because King George III and his ministers failed to reevaluate the war’s objectives, given the changed strategic environment after Saratoga. The resulting British military strategy suffered from an imbalance between ends, ways, and means. Thus, British leaders incurred significant risk in executing their new strategy.

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Cite this article

Kevin J. Weddle, “’A Change of Both Men and Measures’: British Reassessment of Military Strategy after Saratoga, 1777–1778,” The Journal of Military History 77, no. 3 (July 2013): 837–865.

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