The Journal of Military History

Abstract

Traditional narratives of World War I generally overlook a misunderstood but important part of the conflict: information warfare. Both Great Britain and Germany understood the significance of information as a force multiplier and as a valuable financial and diplomatic tool in the larger geostrategic environment. Britain’s systematic wartime destruction of Germany’s prewar network occurred on a much larger level than historians have recognized. Germany’s simultaneous but hidden campaign against Allied communications has escaped historical notice. Greater understanding of this missing element, both in World War I and beyond, will deepen our understanding of the larger economic, political, intelligence, and military dimensions of modern conflict.

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Cite this article

Jonathan Reed Winkler, “Information Warfare in World War I,” The Journal of Military History 73, no. 3 (July 2009): 845–867.

RISBibTeXDOI: 10.1353/jmh.0.0324

Also in Vol. 73, No. 3

  1. Moncado Prize 2010

  2. Research note