Abstract
The Battle of the Golan Heights was one of the critical events of the Yom Kippur War. Most of the current historiography follows the narrative established by Avigdor Kahalani in his work The Heights of Courage, in which the outcome was determined by the skill and courage of the Israeli tank crews of the 7th Armored and Barak brigades. While acknowledging the Israelis’ bravery, this article challenges this conventional approach by stating that it was the Syrians’ tactical incompetence and failure to adhere to Soviet operational doctrine that was the primary cause of the battle’s outcome.
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Cite this article
James L. Young Jr., “The Heights of Ineptitude: The Syrian Army’s Assault on the Golan Heights,” The Journal of Military History 74, no. 3 (July 2010): 847–870.
