Volume 89, Number 1 · January 2025
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Articles
Newspaper coverage of the U.S. Navy in World War I played a significant role in civil-military tensions within the Navy Department. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels cultivated good relations with newspapers, and his attitude toward managing the press was largely limited to protecting sensitive information and ensuring good publicity for the navy. The American naval commander stationed in Europe had a more sophisticated outlook. William S. Sims had fewer qualms about censorship than Daniels, and he realized that the press could be used to his advantage in shaping the administration’s policies. The result was that the press became a pawn in the fractious relationship between the Wilson administration and the senior naval officer in Europe.
During World War II, joint operations between the Italian Royal Air Force and the Italian Royal Navy revealed significant shortcomings, which negatively impacted the military effectiveness of the two services. This article examines how the failure to develop effective interservice cooperation was rooted in the 1920s and 1930s and was due to a lack of direction from Mussolini and the General Staff. The air force and navy also opposed cooperation, considering it risky to their own institutional survival.
Forward surgical care of combat casualties on austere, non-linear battlefields demands mobility, surgical expertise, routes of evacuation, and resource sustainment. Introduced during the Allied New Guinea offensives of 1942, Percy Carroll’s innovative Portable Surgical Hospitals (PSHs) demonstrated capabilities for evaluation, resuscitation, and limited reparative surgery to revive and salvage victims of major battlefield trauma. During the offensives of late 1943, the PSHs again deployed in the dense wilderness Burma; once again, their capabilities were evident. Carroll’s PSHs served as the prototype for current forward surgical units deployed deep in unsecured territory.
This article examines the relationship between the American Graves Registration Command (AGRC) and the International Tracing Service (ITS) in Europe after World War II. While the AGRC searched for the remains of missing American military personnel and the ITS traced civilian victims of the Third Reich, both regularly uncovered documentary and physical evidence sought by the other agency. These twinned searches benefited from and, in some cases, depended on each other in a symbiotic endeavor. This study highlights the cooperation between the American military and an allied agency, as well as the blurred lines between civilian and military casualties.
Following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965, the rebel colony of Rhodesia’s government could no longer submit recommendations for British honors and awards. The creation, in 1969, of a new set of decorations and medals rectified this issue. This article argues that medals were also part of the Rhodesians’ attempt to create a national identity. It also shows that the standard for awards was set extremely high and that aggression, professionalism, and willingness to engage the enemy were the foremost characteristics required to win a Rhodesian medal. At the same time, it contends that the Rhodesians failed to fully exploit the propaganda value of military decorations by the sparing way in which they bestowed them, by shrouding specific awards in secrecy, and by under-awarding them to African personnel.
From January to July 1973, Canada participated in the International Commission of Control and Supervision on ending the U.S. war in Vietnam. The ICCS investigated accusations of violations and supervised prisoner of war exchanges. Although fraught with complexity, contradiction, and lack of cooperation, and based on blurred mandates, the ICCS was a partial success because of the help provided to the American ally. The analysis suggests Canadians remained committed to the international commission despite major political and ideological struggles. The Canadian military thus learned important lessons on Cold War peacekeeping missions in decolonized spaces, on cooperation with U.S. forces, and about international peace mandates.
Review essays
Book reviews (48)
- Does Counter-Terrorism Work?242–243
