Abstract
Two relatively unknown British operations during the Second World War—Operation “Menace” against Dakar (1940) and Operation “Ironclad” against Madagascar (1942)—offer a fascinating contrast, the former being a humiliating failure and the latter a striking success. This article seeks to explain the dramatic difference in their outcomes. Both were directed against Vichy France, with which Britain was not at war, and were undertaken at a time of particularly scarce resources and competing priorities, resulting in great challenges for political leaders and military planners. Unlike “Menace,” “Ironclad” achieved the desired objective at minimum cost to either side, largely by securing and exploiting surprise.
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Cite this article
Tim Benbow, “Menace” to “Ironclad”: The British Operations against Dakar (1940) and Madagascar (1942),” The Journal of Military History 75, no. 3 (July 2011): 769–809.
