Abstract
Using newly available Iraqi records, this article revisits Saddam Hussein’s decision to attack Iran in 1980. His decision defies easy categorization as offensive or defensive, strategic or ideological. The invasion’s rationale reflected a diverse array of factors rather than any single overriding determinant. Simultaneously a defensive response to Iranian provocations and an attempt to exploit post-revolutionary Iranian weakness, the invasion was also thoroughly wound up in Saddam’s ideological proclivities and exalted self-conception. Additionally, Saddam viewed attacking Iran as a step toward assuming his destiny as a great Arab leader and—more intriguingly—as a potential springboard to an eventual war against Israel. Strategy, ideology, and personality flowed together, creating a potent mix.
Read the full article
Members: read on EBSCO
Use the access code from this quarter's member email. Every issue since 1937 is online, with no embargo.
Lost your code? Email jmhsmh@vmi.edu or sign in at the EBSCOhost member login.
Not a member? Buy this article
A PDF sent by email from the Journal office during business hours, $10.
Through a library: sign in with your institution
Full text is in EBSCO's America: History and Life with Full Text and Historical Abstracts with Full Text, and through EBSCO Discovery.
Join: read everything, every year
Membership includes the printed journal and full online access to the archive.
Cite this article
Hal Brands, “Why Did Saddam Invade Iran? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor,” The Journal of Military History 75, no. 3 (July 2011): 861–885.
