Abstract
To date evaluations of tactical air supremacy during the Normandy campaign of 1944 have tended to analyse the erosion of German fighting ability due to the destruction to the transportation system, especially bridges and railways, by Allied air and the Resistance. Attacks on depots have been considered but not in the context of assessing the effectiveness of Allied intelligence gathering on depots. This study presents that analysis. Using archival sources in combination with geoarchaeological records, we hypothesise how a crisis in German logistics could have produced an earlier collapse of German capability, had Allied intelligence been more accurate in reporting German supply activities.
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Cite this article
David Capps-Tunwell, David Passmore, and Stephan Harrison, “An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944,” The Journal of Military History 84, no. 3 (July 2020): 825–842.