Rivers, Rails, and Rebels: Logistics and Struggle to Supply U.S. Army Depot at Nashville, 1862–1865

The Union war effort west of the Appalachians during the American Civil War depended on the ability to supply and defend the massive Union depot in Nashville, Tennessee. Detailed analysis of the logistical problems in supplying Nashville Depot from late February 1862 through April 1865—via the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland River—reveals how the depot was able to support the thousands of Federal troops occupying the city, and also feed, clothe, and arm nearly 150,000 troops during periods of significant guerrilla insurgency. Logistical necessity required control of the Cumberland River from its mouth on the Ohio River to Nashville, and the U.S. Navy was essential to this strategic imperative.

“To Dig and Burrow like Rabbits”: British Field Fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne, September to October 1914, by Bodie D. Dykstra, Journal of Military History 84:3 (July 2020): 747-73

This article examines the British Expeditionary Force’s (BEF’s) use of field fortifications at the Battle of the Aisne in September and October 1914. It concludes that the BEF implemented a tactically robust and effective field works system that it quickly adapted to suit the unprecedented conditions of the battle. Thus, the army was more prepared for the combat realities of 1914 than much of the scholarship since the 1970s has implied. The BEF, however, struggled to apply the lessons of the Aisne in Flanders in late October 1914, portending the learning curve that characterized tactical development in 1915–18.