The Journal of Military History

Abstract

In the narrative of the Iraq War, General George Casey has taken on the role of a conventional, inflexible commander who turned away from counterinsurgency and pushed hard to get U.S. troops out of Iraq. The situation was bad when he handed command to General David Petraeus, who oversaw a dramatic turnaround. New evidence has emerged that warrants a re-evaluation of Casey’s approach to Iraq, though; it demonstrates that Casey may have been the chief driver of improved counterinsurgency understanding in the U.S. military prior to the publication of FM3-24, Counterinsurgency, and that Casey established conditions from which his successor benefited.

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Cite this article

Darrell Fawley III, “Rethinking Command in Iraq: George Casey and Multi-National Forces-Iraq, 2004–2007,” The Journal of Military History 90, no. 2 (April 2026): 429–452.

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