Abstract
In 1969 President Richard Nixon took the unprecedented step of unilaterally eliminating an entire class of weapons, biological warfare agents, and retaining only a defensive research program. He also limited the nation’s chemical weapons efforts to retaliation. Little research has been done into the policy review that led to the decisions, particularly the role of the Army, which oversaw the programs. Using recently declassified documents, this article analyzes the history behind the policy changes. It illustrates as well that the Army was cut out of the review, but that its mismanagement of the programs was, ironically, a key factor in their demise. It also shows that many in the service’s leadership actually came to support Nixon’s moves.
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Cite this article
David I. Goldman, “The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969,” The Journal of Military History 73, no. 2 (April 2009): 531–569.
