The Journal of Military History

Abstract

In 1969 President Richard Nixon took the unprecedented step of unilaterally eliminating an entire class of weapons, biological warfare agents, and retaining only a defensive research program. He also limited the nation’s chemical weapons efforts to retaliation. Little research has been done into the policy review that led to the decisions, particularly the role of the Army, which oversaw the programs. Using recently declassified documents, this article analyzes the history behind the policy changes. It illustrates as well that the Army was cut out of the review, but that its mismanagement of the programs was, ironically, a key factor in their demise. It also shows that many in the service’s leadership actually came to support Nixon’s moves.

Read the full article

Members: read on EBSCO

Use the access code from this quarter's member email. Every issue since 1937 is online, with no embargo.

Open on EBSCO

Lost your code? Email jmhsmh@vmi.edu or sign in at the EBSCOhost member login.

Not a member? Buy this article

A PDF sent by email from the Journal office during business hours, $10.

Order the PDF

Through a library: sign in with your institution

Full text is in EBSCO's America: History and Life with Full Text and Historical Abstracts with Full Text, and through EBSCO Discovery.

Institutional sign-in

Join: read everything, every year

Membership includes the printed journal and full online access to the archive.

Join the Society

Cite this article

David I. Goldman, “The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969,” The Journal of Military History 73, no. 2 (April 2009): 531–569.

RISBibTeXDOI: 10.1353/jmh.0.0242

Also in Vol. 73, No. 2

  1. Moncado Prize 2010

  2. Forum

  3. Forum

  4. Forum

  5. Forum