Volume 73, Number 2 · April 2009

The epitome of the medieval warrior, the hero of the chanson, the glorious competitor in the sports of the tournament, was the iuvenis: a knight not necessarily ‘young’ in age, but rather, young in his career. When the early medieval historians of the First Crusade (1096–1099) are read with regard to their use of this term, it becomes clear that they saw a distinct grouping of iuvenes as being present on the crusade. These knights, despite a certain recklessness and indiscipline, were portrayed as playing an important military role in the Christian army.

The 1846–48 conflict between the United States and Mexico was the first U.S. war in which military victory over the foe’s conventional army and successful resistance to partisan attacks failed to produce the desired political outcome. Only by subsequently providing assistance to the dominant political and socio-economic groups of Mexico could the United States obtain a peace treaty legitimizing the conquest of Mexican territory. In this regard, the war stands as a precursor to challenges the United States would encounter in subsequent conflicts of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries.

This paper examines the origins of the Battle of the Somme within the context of French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre’s effort to coordinate Allied military operations in 1916 and to mount a combined Anglo-French offensive on the Western Front. The French chose a joint operation on the Somme, in which they would play the major role, as a means of leading the British into battle. But a major British attritional operation preceding the offensive was dropped, and ironically, the French Army bore the brunt of Allied wastage in the German attack at Verdun until the Somme offensive began on 1 July 1916.

Following the Armistice and Kaiser Wilhelm II’s abdication in November 1918, Allied and Associated Powers leaders grappled with the Central Powers’ responsibility for “war guilt.” Among those placing the blame squarely on the German Kaiser was a former U.S. senator, Colonel Luke Lea, who actively pursued an unsanctioned personal task: seizing Wilhelm as a war criminal. Recently discovered documentation sheds new light on Lea’s mission to transport the Kaiser from a Dutch castle for a trial before the Paris Peace Conference. Lea’s “amazingly indiscreet” plan complements and broadly compares to similar views shared by senior Allied leaders at the end of World War I.

The Combined Operations organisation and British Army and Royal Marine Commandos conducted three large-scale raids against the Norwegian coast in 1941 and a series of smaller operations in 1942 and 1943. This article examines the reasons for the shifts in British raiding policy during this period and places the Norwegian raids in their wider strategic context. Although these raids had little material consequence and were conducted on the periphery of the main theatres of operations, they proved beneficial in terms of experience gained in triservice operations and the subsequent overcommitment of German resources to Norway in response.

The British colonial regime in India was heavily dependent on the Indian Army, whose rank and file were Indians but whose officers were British. Despite the apathy of the Indian populace and the hostility of the Indian political parties, the Indian Army remained loyal to its colonial masters during World War II. This article examines the extent of that loyalty and the reasons behind it. Focusing principally on the Indian units that fought in Burma, it analyzes combat motivation and loyalty throughout the war. The article also considers the British elite’s concern about the Indian soldiers’ loyalty and whether it would change during postwar demobilization.

In 1969 President Richard Nixon took the unprecedented step of unilaterally eliminating an entire class of weapons, biological warfare agents, and retaining only a defensive research program. He also limited the nation’s chemical weapons efforts to retaliation. Little research has been done into the policy review that led to the decisions, particularly the role of the Army, which oversaw the programs. Using recently declassified documents, this article analyzes the history behind the policy changes. It illustrates as well that the Army was cut out of the review, but that its mismanagement of the programs was, ironically, a key factor in their demise. It also shows that many in the service’s leadership actually came to support Nixon’s moves.

Jefferson Davis is credited with authoring an offensive-defensive Confederate strategy. This pillar of Civil War historiography is incorrect, having been derived from a misunderstanding of the levels of policy and war, and the misreading of scant primary source documentation.

Jefferson Davis evaluated the Confederacy’s national resources and capabilities and decided that in order to win its independence the Confederacy was going to have to fight mostly on the strategic defensive. Davis maintained mostly a defensive outlook throughout the Civil War but shifted to strategic offensives a few times when he believed or was persuaded that an exceptional offensive was likely to contribute to winning independence. During and after the war Davis called his strategic approach the “offensive-defensive.” Although it is a cumbersome term, the “offensive-defensive” strategy remains a valid phrase to describe the strategy Davis used to conduct of the war.