The Baltic and Admiralty War Planning, 1906–1907

For decades, a belief has persisted that before 1914 the Admiralty in Edwardian Britain was strategically bereft, if not bankrupt, when faced with the modern conditions imposed on naval warfare by mines, torpedoes and submarines. War plans generated under the regime of Admiral Sir A. John “Jacky” Fisher, in particular, have been scorned as politically-inspired smokescreens, designed to prop up Fisher’s position as First Sea Lord. A re-examination of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany, however, and the contexts within which they were drafted, especially the Baltic neutrality crisis provoked by Norwegian independence in 1905, indicates that the measures were legitimate contingency plans designed to effectively exploit the Royal Navy’s ability to strike decisively at Germany’s military and economic assets in the Baltic. New evidence, with respect to pre-existing strategic planning, fleet manoeuvres, British East Coast development and the procurement of vessels to fill tactical requirements detailed in the plans, demonstrate that previous skeptical interpretations of the Fisher Admiralty’s strategic acumen have been mistaken.