Volume 74, Number 2 · April 2010

The study of the field artillery of the American Civil War (1861–65) has often focused upon the technical aspects of the arm and assessed military performance largely in terms of these criteria. This article examines an understudied influence upon field artillery performance in the form of horse supply, highlighting the problems both armies faced trying to find and maintain animals for their guns. As well as creating strategic and tactical problems for both armies, shortage of horse supply influenced the Confederate decision to substantially reorganise their batteries by 1863. The difficulties of horse supply and its effect on artillery performance have implications for the wider debate on whether the American Civil War marked the beginnings of “modern” war.

Disease killed two-thirds of the soldiers who died during the Civil War. And of the various maladies that plagued both armies, few were more pervasive than malaria—a mosquito-borne illness which afflicted over 1.1 million soldiers serving in the Union ranks. Yellow fever, another disease transmitted by mosquitoes, struck fear into the hearts of military planners who knew that “yellow jack” could wipe out an entire army in a matter of weeks. Bell examines the physiological and psychological effects of these two diseases and their impact on military operations and strategy in 1862, the first full year of the war.

For decades, a belief has persisted that before 1914 the Admiralty in Edwardian Britain was strategically bereft, if not bankrupt, when faced with the modern conditions imposed on naval warfare by mines, torpedoes and submarines. War plans generated under the regime of Admiral Sir A. John “Jacky” Fisher, in particular, have been scorned as politically-inspired smokescreens, designed to prop up Fisher’s position as First Sea Lord. A re-examination of the Ballard Committee’s 1907 War Plans against Germany, however, and the contexts within which they were drafted, especially the Baltic neutrality crisis provoked by Norwegian independence in 1905, indicates that the measures were legitimate contingency plans designed to effectively exploit the Royal Navy’s ability to strike decisively at Germany’s military and economic assets in the Baltic. New evidence, with respect to pre-existing strategic planning, fleet manoeuvres, British East Coast development and the procurement of vessels to fill tactical requirements detailed in the plans, demonstrate that previous skeptical interpretations of the Fisher Admiralty’s strategic acumen have been mistaken.

In 1935 Major Dwight Eisenhower accompanied General Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines, where MacArthur was tasked with creating a Philippine army capable of defending an independent Philippines. Eisenhower’s odyssey in the American colony (1935–39) left him with a deep and indelible negative impression of MacArthur. Historians have disputed the cause and depth of the rift. Ike’s disagreements with MacArthur were more philosophical than personal and concerned two significant issues: building an army in a developing but still impoverished country, and the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates. The dispute and resulting antipathy lasted the rest of their lives.

Although war patrol reports provide a staple source for histories of U.S. submarine operations during the Second World War, their reliability is open to question and they should be read critically. The “fog of war” often produced exaggerated claims about ships sunk. Submarine commanders in rare cases fabricated parts of reports, and frequently made deliberate omissions for security reasons or to avoid censure. To an extent, war patrol reports should be treated as literary productions. Because the reports passed up the chain of command and circulated widely among submariners, strong incentives ensured that they reflected well on personnel and provided a readable and sometimes entertaining narrative.

The role of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in the early phases of the Normandy landings of June 1944 has been poorly understood by historians. In particular, the beachhead battles of 7-10 June against the 12th SS Hitler Youth Panzer Division are dismissed as failed attempts to push forward, and typical examples of faulty Anglo-Canadian doctrine, tactics, and leadership. This article argues that none of that is true. Historians have misunderstood the role of the Canadian division in Operation OVERLORD and the larger Allied assumptions that formed the basis of its operational orders. The Canadian role was to stop the panzer counterattack on the crucial ground west of Caen that both Allied and German planners had identified as decisive. The Canadian task was therefore primarily defensive and, although the counterattack did not develop as Allied planners had feared, the Canadians denied 1st SS Panzer Corps the ground it sought for the basis of that attack. In doing so, the Canadians and their supporting British units fought much better than historians have suggested.

From 1980 to 1992, the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) fought each other in a civil conflict that devastated El Salvador, killing 75,000 people and leaving thousands more homeless or injured. Over 80 percent of the government’s troops and over 20 percent of the FMLN’s were under eighteen years of age; however, thus far, historians have missed the centrality of the role of children in this conflict. This article explores the legacy of both sides’ reliance on child soldiers and examines the costs of child soldiering in terms of demobilization issues and postwar societal problems.