The Journal of Military History

Abstract

This article looks at the failure of the Japanese Army and Navy to use Hong Kong to control the South China coast between 1942 and 1945. This was the result of their inability to cooperate at the strategic and operational levels and also of their shortage of resources. In addition, the flawed shipping-protection tactics adopted by the Japanese Navy, the incomplete control of the Japanese forces over the South China coast, and the resistance of Allied guerrilla and intelligence units, all helped prevent Hong Kong from becoming a useful base for the Japanese. The Japanese sought to dominate the South China Sea through a huge land offensive, but the costly campaign did not alter the course of the war.

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Cite this article

Chi Man Kwong, “The Failure of Japanese Land-Sea Cooperation during the Second World War: Hong Kong and the South China Coast as an Example, 1942–1945,” The Journal of Military History 79, no. 1 (January 2015): 69–91.

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