Abstract
The Luochuan Conference of August 1937 was a crucial moment in Mao Zedong’s struggle for power. Mao tried to force the party to adopt his guerrilla war strategy; he failed. Mao nonetheless exploited his position as the Politburo member in charge of military affairs, and put his strategy into action in fall 1937. Mao’s actions worried Josef Stalin, who was depending on Chiang Kai-shek to keep Japan from invading Siberia. Mao therefore moderated his behavior, but clung to his strategy. This article shows how Mao managed to win Stalin and the CCP over to his strategy, and thus consolidated his hold on the CCP.
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Cite this article
Sherman Xiaogang Lai, “’The Devil is in the Details’: Mao Zedong before and after the Luochuan Conference, August 1937,” The Journal of Military History 85, no. 4 (October 2021): 930–953.