Abstract
By 1943, the German army deployed in the Soviet Union was engaged in a total war with an enemy far superior in material and manpower resources. Recognizing this disparity, German field commands instituted more systematic and conciliatory policies designed to mobilize Soviet resources for the German war effort. Attempts to win over the population changed following German defeat in the Battle of Kursk, however; German policy became more violently coercive. An examination of the policies and actions of three German divisions will demonstrate that the army’s shifting conduct was due to its understanding of the reality of total war.
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Cite this article
Jeff Rutherford, “Germany’s Total War: Combat and Occupation around the Kursk Salient, 1943,” The Journal of Military History 85, no. 4 (October 2021): 954–979.