Abstract
This article argues that U.S. occupations in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti in the first third of the twentieth century lasted as long as they did for political reasons. U.S. military commanders disagreed with civilians in the State Department partly because of a lack of both policy guidance and interdepartmental coordination. In addition, State grew more sensitive than Navy to negative public opinion both foreign and domestic and to national political strategy. Marines, meanwhile, were more driven to reform the societies they occupied but also less sensitive to their own abuses, to changing norms, and to geopolitical reasons for ending occupations.
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Cite this article
Alan McPherson, “Lid Sitters and Prestige Seekers: The U.S. Navy versus the State Department and the End of U.S. Occupations,” The Journal of Military History 78, no. 1 (January 2014): 73–99.
