Abstract
In the 1920s and 1930s U.S. naval planners expected that a war against Japan would involve a grand, daylight fleet engagement that would be dominated by large caliber gunfire. When war broke out and American admirals found themselves fighting small-scale nighttime battles in the confined waters of the Solomon Sea in late 1942, they chose to employ their gun-oriented daytime tactics, resulting in numerous tactical defeats. Not until U.S. commanders learned to respect the power of the surface-launched torpedo—both as an offensive weapon and as a threat to be guarded against—would the U.S. Navy enjoy success in nighttime combat.
Read the full article
Members: read on EBSCO
Use the access code from this quarter's member email. Every issue since 1937 is online, with no embargo.
Lost your code? Email jmhsmh@vmi.edu or sign in at the EBSCOhost member login.
Not a member? Buy this article
A PDF sent by email from the Journal office during business hours, $10.
Through a library: sign in with your institution
Full text is in EBSCO's America: History and Life with Full Text and Historical Abstracts with Full Text, and through EBSCO Discovery.
Join: read everything, every year
Membership includes the printed journal and full online access to the archive.
Cite this article
Jeff Reardon, “Breaking the U.S. Navy’s ’Gun Club’ Mentality in the South Pacific,” The Journal of Military History 75, no. 2 (April 2011): 533–564.
