Abstract
This article addresses the reasons behind the rapid escalation of French security force and vigilante violence employed to suppress the Sétif uprising that broke out in colonial Algeria on VE-Day, 8 May 1945. Recourse to overwhelming military force to put down the uprising illustrated French capacity to terrorize Algerian civilians, but it should not conceal the structural weakness of the colonial state. Political initiative passed inexorably to France’s anticolonial opponents, precisely the outcome that state coercion was intended to avoid. Algeria’s nationalists may have lost the battle in May 1945, but, thanks to colonial authorities’ failings, they were already winning the war.
Read the full article
Members: read on EBSCO
Use the access code from this quarter's member email. Every issue since 1937 is online, with no embargo.
Lost your code? Email jmhsmh@vmi.edu or sign in at the EBSCOhost member login.
Not a member? Buy this article
A PDF sent by email from the Journal office during business hours, $10.
Through a library: sign in with your institution
Full text is in EBSCO's America: History and Life with Full Text and Historical Abstracts with Full Text, and through EBSCO Discovery.
Join: read everything, every year
Membership includes the printed journal and full online access to the archive.
Cite this article
Martin Thomas, “Colonial Violence in Algeria and the Distorted Logic of State Retribution: The Sétif Uprising of 1945,” The Journal of Military History 75, no. 1 (January 2011): 125–157.
