Abstract
The Dacian wars of Domitian (84–89) and Trajan (101–102, 105–106) are here set within the strategic context of Roman involvement with the Lower Danubian region. A survey of developments from the late first century B.C. through the reign of Hadrian (117–138 A.D.) identifies this area as a real frontier problem that required (and received) planning, contrary to the views of deniers of Roman strategy. Roman failures on occasion are not a basis for denial of strategy. Roman geographical ignorance, a favorite tenet of the “no strategy” school, is shown for this frontier to be a false argument.
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Cite this article
Everett L. Wheeler, “Rome’s Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube, Part II,” The Journal of Military History 75, no. 1 (January 2011): 191–219.