Abstract
During his year as ambassador in Saigon (1964–65), Maxwell Taylor saw the United States go to war. Based on what he thought had led to the armistice in Korea (1953), Taylor believed an air campaign against North Vietnam could force the leadership in Hanoi to accept an independent South Vietnam. He did not believe American ground forces could win the war. Taylor’s experience in Saigon, his disagreement with General William Westmoreland on airpower and land war, and his interactions with President Lyndon Johnson shed new light on when, how, and why LBJ determined it was time to go to war in Vietnam.
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Cite this article
Ingo Trauschweizer, “Cautious Hawk: Maxwell Taylor and the Path to War in Vietnam,” The Journal of Military History 83, no. 3 (July 2019): 831–859.