Volume 83, Number 3 · July 2019

Decimation is a notorious punishment inflicted by the Roman army. One tenth of a unit accused of cowardice or gross dereliction of duty was chosen by lot and beaten to death (fustuarium) by the rest of the legion. It is traditionally viewed as a method of instilling discipline through fear, but in practice rarely occurred. This paper reexamines decimation using modern “primary group” theory. It concludes that decimation was not a destructive force but a healing one. It reintegrated offending units through collective acceptance of both guilt and the necessity for punishment.

The Mamluk siege of Montfort castle provides a rare opportunity to examine one of the most celebrated but also misrepresented technologies of the Middle Ages: mechanical artillery. The castle was inhabited for only about forty-five years before it was taken and then destroyed by the Mamluks, creating a time capsule for archaeologists to peer into life in a mid-thirteenth-century stronghold and carefully examine evidence of the siege that ultimately led to its abandonment. Among the finds are a number of artillery projectiles that date to the final siege of the castle. An investigation of the surrounding topography has revealed that there are only a couple of places from which these stones could have been thrown. This rare combination of clearly datable projectiles and a topographical environment that provides a good indication of range allows for a unique quantitative assessment of the development of trebuchet technology.

The actual size of Bulgarian medieval armies, reputedly among the largest and most successful European armies of the day, has continued to interest historians, but serious studies have generally relied on evidence drawn from a handful of specific events. This article aims to ascertain army size from a survey of Bulgarian medieval military history. It will provide a critical overview of army size during the entire medieval period, from the First Bulgarian Empire (681–1018) through the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185–1422), as the country evolved from a semi-nomadic state into a centralized empire whose armies were able to hold their own against their regional foes, particularly the more powerful Byzantine Empire.

This article traces the history behind the myth of Polish horse cavalry charging German tanks in the opening days of the Second World War. Focusing on Polish sources, it argues that while the cavalry did not charge armored vehicles, it was nonetheless a vital branch in the Polish military at the outset of the war. For most of the interwar era, the Soviet Union was a greater threat to Polish security than Germany. With a vast eastern front to defend, limited industrial production, and difficulty obtaining foreign loans, the cavalry served as an important component of the Polish army against Soviet offensive military doctrine. Even though war first erupted with Germany, the branch still proved its effectiveness by adapting to the modern battlefield. Horses were mainly used for transportation and maneuvering rather than fighting. Although seen as an outdated weapon by many over the years, the evolution of armor and cavalry in Poland was similar to that in other countries.

This article traces the development of the Soviet political-military leadership’s response to perceived threats during the years immediately preceding the German invasion of June 1941. Drawing heavily from post-Soviet documents as well as contemporary memoirs, it focuses on Soviet mobilization plans from 1938 to 1941, showing the gradual evolution from the relatively indecisive March 1939 variation to the final May 1941 plan, which called for a preemptive attack against German concentrations along the western frontier. The article offers reasons for the Soviet failure to implement the 1941 preemptive strike plan and concludes with a broad overview of the evolution of Soviet planning for war.

This article explains how exploitation of research and development (R&D) configured into the post–World War II policies of the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) and U.S. Air Force (USAF). The narrative follows the coordination of operations LUSTY, OVERCAST, and PAPERCLIP and the Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) in the AAF’s exploitation of intelligence and reparations for postwar policies and politics. The history of the SAG’s efforts from 1944 to 1947 reveals the intensity with which the AAF and its consultants in the aeronautical sciences pursued Nazi R&D. The article helps explain the place of intelligence and reparations in AAF and USAF policies for postwar R&D.

During his year as ambassador in Saigon (1964–65), Maxwell Taylor saw the United States go to war. Based on what he thought had led to the armistice in Korea (1953), Taylor believed an air campaign against North Vietnam could force the leadership in Hanoi to accept an independent South Vietnam. He did not believe American ground forces could win the war. Taylor’s experience in Saigon, his disagreement with General William Westmoreland on airpower and land war, and his interactions with President Lyndon Johnson shed new light on when, how, and why LBJ determined it was time to go to war in Vietnam.